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SUMMARY 
Many accident-control procedures presently available to the safety 
engineer for use in controlling accidents are primarily concerned with 
past accident performance or with the observation and evaluation of 
worker behavior, rather than with the hazards inherent in industrial 
operations. The few procedures that are concerned with the hazards of 
an operation are primarily of a subjective nature. There is presently 
no procedure that provides an objective, quantitative method of evaluat­
ing the degree of hazard in an industrial operation. A procedure of 
this type would allow management to direct the safety effort toward 
those operations with the greatest degree of inherent hazard in an 
attempt to reduce accidents by concentrating on those operations that 
have the greatest potential for causing an accident. 
A form similar to a job evaluation point rating form has been 
developed to be used in rating the hazard potential of an industrial 
operation. In this study, the ability of the use of this form to predict 
those operations that cause the greatest number of accidents and the 
most severe accidents was tested. Several operations at two industrial 
plants were observed and were rated using the previously developed form# 
The ratings determined were correlated with historical accident data for 
the operations rated to determine the predictive ability of the form. 
The analysis indicated that the hazard ratings were positively 
correlated with several of the past accident data that were studied. 
This would indicate that the use of the hazard rating form could provide 
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During the early years of American industry, accidents were thought 
to be inherent in industrial operations. Management and the employee 
accepted the belief that accidents were inevitable in the performance 
of industrial operations and little attempt was made to control these 
accidents. The attitude was that accidents were a risk incurred in the 
performance of industrial operations and this should be accepted without 
question. As time passed, management began to introduce some accident-
control measures. These measures were introduced primarily to comply 
with legislation that had been passed and consisted primarily of the 
guarding of machinery. These early accident-control measures were re­
garded as welfare activities and no thought was given to the fact that 
the reduction of accidents might lead to a more efficient operation and 
thus an increase in production. However, in 1928, it was shown that an 
increase in the safety effort could result in an increase in the produc­
tion effort as the Committee on Safety and Production of the American 
Engineering Council stated "that there is a positive correlation between 
safety and efficiency of production and, in general, the safe factory is 
the efficient factory" (1). This changed management's attitude toward 
safety and management began to place more emphasis on safety performance 
in an attempt to realize gains in production. 
As industry realized that safety performance plays an important 
part in the efficient operation of an industrial plant, accident-control 
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activities received increasing emphasis. This led to the development 
of several accident-control procedures that are used to evaluate safety 
performance and to indicate the most hazardous operations, plants, and 
industries. The majority of these procedures are limited to their use 
by the fact that they are after-the-fact techniques or are concerned 
primarily with behavior rather than hazards that are inherent in the 
operations. They are measures of the accidents or behavior that have 
already occurred and are beneficial only to show the relative safety 
performance of one operation, plant, or industry as compared to another 
operation, plant, or industry. Little attempt has been made to evaluate 
the inherent hazards in industrial operations and thus reduce accidents 
by controlling the hazards within the operation. 
At present the two primary accident-control measures are the 
frequency rate and the severity rate. They are defined by the United 
States of America Standards Institute in the following way (2): 
Disabling Injury Frequency Rate 
Number of Disabling Injuries x 1,000,000 
Employee-hours of Exposure 
Disabling Injury Severity Rate = 
Total Days Charged x 1,000,000 
Employee-hours of Exposure 
The operations, plants, and industries with the highest rates are con­
sidered to be the most hazardous and the safety effort is directed toward 
these. As can be seen these two accident-control indicators are concerned 
only with disabling injuries and the time which is lost due to these in­
juries. For adequate statistical reliability sizable manhour exposure 
is required. In many cases the number of accidents and the amount of 
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exposure within a reasonable time period is relatively small and the 
rates tend to be unreliable. These rates are computed after the acci­
dents have occurred. If the potential for an accident exists it will 
not be recognized unless a disabling injury accident has occurred. 
Another accident-control measurement is suggested by Thomas H. 
Rockwell (3). Rockwell suggests using activity sampling methods to 
determine the extent of unsafe behavior. The procedure consists of 
taking random instantaneous observations of industrial operations and 
noting whether the worker is engaged in safe or unsafe behavior. By 
plotting these data on control charts, it can be determined which 
operations present the greatest accident potential according to worker 
behavior. This procedure requires the ability to dichotomize behavior 
as safe or unsafe. Also no attempt is made to evaluate the seriousness 
of the unsafe acts committed. The procedure is concerned only with 
worker behavior and not with hazards inherent in the operations. 
Earl J. Ferguson and James M. Daschbach (4) have described an 
accident-control procedure known as the SAF-HANS method (Safety through 
Frequency of Hazards Analysis). This procedure makes use of a memo 
motion camera system to record data on film. The camera is mounted on 
a fork-lift truck and operated continuously through an entire work 
shift while the operator of the truck goes about his regular duties. 
The film is evaluated by noting the number of hazards recorded by the 
camera. A complete list of the hazards and their frequency is compiled 
through any desired time period. The safety program then emphasizes 
the hazards occurring most frequently and the procedure is repeated to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the program in reducing the indicated 
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hazards. This procedure is limited in that only the hazards seen by the 
camera will be considered and the hazards noted are those caused by 
worker behavior and not hazards inherent in the industrial operations. 
The use of Safe-t-Scores is an accident-control procedure devel­
oped by J. A. Martin (5), This procedure is based on the assumption 
that the past performance of any group is its best standard for compari­
son. A base period, or the standard for comparison, is chosen. The 
Safe-t-Score is then computed. The Safe-t-Score is based on the "t" 
test which can be used to test the means of two groups of comparable 
data for significant differences. The Safe-t-Score is defined as follows: 
Safe-t-Score = 
(Freq. Rate for Current Period) -
(Freq. Rate for Base Period) 
\ Freq. Rate for Base Period 
\ Million Manhours in Current Period 
Once the Safe-t-Score has been computed it is compared to a predetermined 
range to see if the frequency rate under consideration was the same; 
was significantly worse; or was significantly better than the base 
year selected. This will allow the safety effort to be directed toward 
those groups that have significant variations away from their established 
base. This is an indication that there is an assignable cause for the 
relatively poor performance of the group and the safety effort will be 
directed toward the group in an attempt to determine the cause. This 
procedure is based on accidents that have already occurred and no 
attempt is made to determine the hazards that caused the accidents and 
reduce or eliminate them. 
Another accident-control procedure is based on the assumption 
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that there is a definite relationship between the rate of safety activi­
ties and the injury frequency rate (6). This procedure is known as the 
activity rate and is defined as follows: 
... ... .. safety activity x 5,000,000 
activity rate = ** ** 1 *' *- 1 
J man-hours worked x avg. number of employees 
Safety activity is the sum (during the unit period) of: (1) safety re­
commendations; (2) unsafe practices reported; (3) unsafe conditions 
reported; (4) the number of safety meetings held. This procedure pro­
vides a quantitative measure of safety activity and enables it to be 
compared with accident frequency. Thereby, unfavorable trends in acci­
dent frequency can be forecast and avoided. The use of the activity rate 
is limited to unsafe practices and conditions that have already occurred 
and to the number of safety recommendations and the number of safety 
meetings held regardless of quality or suitability. The procedure does 
not indicate the most hazardous operations. 
William E. Tarrants (7) discusses the use of the critical inci­
dent technique to identify the causal factors (hazards) involved in 
injurious accidents. In using this technique a number of persons who 
have performed particular jobs are interviewed. They are asked to recall 
and describe unsafe acts and unsafe conditions that they can remember 
existing within these industrial operations. These incidents are trans­
cribed and classified into hazard categories from which accident problem 
areas can be defined. Unfortunately the use of the critical incident 
technique is not fully understood by the majority of safety investigators 
and does not provide a means of quantitatively determining the degree 
of hazard in industrial operations. 
An accident-control procedure which singles out incidents with 
6 
high accident potential before serious injuries occur is the use of "High 
Potential Accident Analysis" as proposed by William W. Allison (8). This 
procedure advocates concentrating on and correcting the hazards that 
cause high potential accidents that result in minor injuries, property 
damage, or in no injury at all. High potential accidents are defined 
as those that did, or under similar or slightly different circumstances, 
could result in serious injury or damage. This procedure concentrates 
on the hazards in industrial operations but it is an after-the-fact tech­
nique that requires the occurrence of a near injury or an injury acci­
dent before becoming concerned with the existing hazard. 
There have been several accident-control procedures developed 
that attempt to evaluate a potentially hazardous activity before it 
develops. A. D. Swain (9) has proposed evaluating the operation in the 
design stage. Safety should be integrated into the operation in the 
initial stages of development. Periodic follow-up inspections would 
then be made to determine if any hazardous conditions had developed 
since the operation was implemented. However, this procedure does not 
provide an objective rating to evaluate the degree of hazard that is 
present. 
Another accident-control procedure that is primarily concerned 
with hazards that are inherent in industrial operations is that of 
methods safety analysis as presented by John V. Grimaldi (10). In this 
procedure each job or operation is first broken down into its elementary 
steps'. These elementary steps are then analyzed, much as an operations 
analyst investigates the steps of a job with the aim of eliminating those 
steps that are unnecessary or substituting for those that are inefficient. 
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However, when conducting a safety analysis the safety investigator is 
concerned with each step for its possibility for causing an accident. 
The safety investigator then attempts to eliminate or modify the poten­
tially hazardous steps. This procedure, primarily a methods improvement 
procedure, provides a somewhat objective means of determining the haz­
ard potential in an industrial operation but it is limited by the fact 
that it requires a thorough, time-consuming analysis of each operation 
and it does not allow an objective comparison to be made among different 
operations. 
None of the procedures described provides an objective, quantita­
tive method of evaluating the degree of hazard, or the accident poten­
tial, in an industrial operation. The development of a procedure of 
this type would allow an industrial plant to determine the operations 
that have the greatest potential for causing an accident. Safety efforts 
would then be directed toward those operations of highest potential in 
an attempt to reduce accidents by focusing on those operations that have 
the greatest degree of inherent hazard. Once management has attempted 
to control the hazards within the operation, a re-evaluation of the 
operation can be made. In this way, management will have a current 
record of priorities for safety efforts. 
Edward F. M. Hodge (11) has developed a hazard rating form that 
provides an objective, quantitative procedure for the evaluation of the 
degree of hazard in industrial operations. The objective of this thesis 
is to test the reliability and the predictive ability of the form. 
The use of this form should provide a means for determining those 
operations that cause the greatest number of accidents and the most 
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severe accidents. Various industrial operations will be observed and 
the degree of hazard present will be quantitatively determined through 
the use of this form. These ratings will be correlated with historical 
accident data to determine the predictive ability of the procedure. 
The correlation developed will then be studied to determine the validity 
of the procedure. 
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CHAPTER II 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE HAZARD POTENTIAL RATING FORM 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, there are several accident-
control procedures presently available to the safety engineer to be used 
in controlling accidents. Most of these procedures are concerned with 
either past accident performance, which results in the safety engineer 
spending more time in analyzing accidents that have already occurred 
than in trying to prevent future cases from occurring, or with the obser­
vation and evaluation of worker behavior, which emphasizes the unsafe 
acts of the workers rather than the hazards of the operation. There 
are very few procedures concerned with hazards that are inherent in 
industrial operations and the procedures that do exist depend primarily 
on subjective evaluations. However, a study conducted by a National 
Safety Council Committee yielded the following results (12): 
18 percent of injuries due wholly to mechanical causes 
19 percent of injuries due wholly to personal causes 
63 percent due to a combination of both of these causes 
Accidents are for the most part a combination of worker behavior and 
physical hazards. There are presently several accident-control proce­
dures available that focus on worker behavior. What is now needed is 
a before-the-fact objective procedure that will allow the operation to 
be rated according to the degree of hazard present rather than rating 
the worker performing the operation. This type of procedure is needed 
in order to allow management to selectively control the distribution of 
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the effort for accident control. The most effective safety program is 
concerned with directing its efforts toward those operations of greatest 
accident potential rather than with the elimination of all risks or 
hazards. This allows a favorable balance to be obtained between the 
cost of accident control and the reduction of accident cost. Manage­
ment can direct its safety efforts toward those operations that receive 
the highest ratings and attempt to minimize the hazards that are inherent 
in the operation and that could lead to serious injury. 
Edward F. M. Hodge (13) has developed a hazard potential rating 
form that will allow industrial operations to be evaluated according to 
the degree of hazard present. The remainder of this chapter will discuss 
the development of this form and the two following chapters will be con­
cerned with the application and testing of the form. 
The form developed is comparable in design to the job evaluation 
point rating form used by many companies. The completed form is a 
collection of relevant hazards. Similar to a job evaluation form, each 
hazard has been assigned a weight and the appropriate number of degrees 
has been determined and the degrees have been defined. 
The initial step in the development of the Hazard Potential Rating 
Form was to determine what hazards should be included in the form. Nine 
major elements of hazard were selected as it was felt that these elements 
were common to most industrial enterprises and data from the National 
Safety Council seemed to substantiate this decision. Once these elements 
were'selected they were strictly defined (Table 1) in order to avoid 
repetition and overlap. 
The next step was the accumulation of relevant data needed to 
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develop the form. The data that were collected were analyzed to deter­
mine the importance of each type of hazard with reference to its cost 
to the company and the percentage contribution of each hazard element 
to the overall accident level. These two indicators of accident impor­
tance were balanced with each other and used in assigning weights to 
the individual hazard that was being considered. 
The final step in the development of the form was the differentia­
tion of each hazard into appropriate degrees, following the same proce­
dure as used in establishing a job evaluation point rating system. It 
was arbitrarily decided that a scale consisting of five degrees was 
desired for the evaluation. These degrees of hazard were then clearly 
defined and points were assigned for each degree (Table 2 ) . The column 
entitled "max pts." refers to the maximum number of rating points that 
can be assigned to that degree of hazard by the rating individual. In 
assigning points to each degree, a basic scale consisting of the numbers 
zero through four was used. The numbers of the basic scale were multi­
plied by the already determined weighting factor for each hazard element 
to arrive at the number of points assigned to each degree. 
Following the definition of each degree and the assigning of 
points to each degree all of the hazard elements were then arranged 
into the completed Hazard Potential Rating Form (Table 3 ) . The evaluation 
form also includes a section that allows the operation being rated to be 
adequately and sufficiently identified and also permits the inclusion 
of other relevant information. 
The form developed was not intended to be representative of any 
particular industry. Rather it was developed to illustrate the procedure 
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for developing a form of this type and was based on accident data taken 
from the industrial safety records accumulated and published by the 
National Safety Council (14). It was recommended that a separate form 
be developed for each company in order that the necessary hazards be 
included and that data relevant to the particular company be used. 
However, the development of this form was based on comprehensive acci­
dent data relevant to the total accident picture and the hazards included 
in the form represent practically all of the relevant hazards that cause 
accidents. Therefore, this form has a more universal aspect than was 
originally thought and the completed form shown in Table 3 will be the 
one subjected to the testing rather than developing a new form for each 
company investigated. 
In the following chapters, specific industrial operations will 
be rated using the developed Hazard Potential Rating Form. The ratings 
arrived at will then be compared with past accident data to determine 
the effectiveness of the use of the Hazard Potential Rating Form as a 
measurement of hazard. 
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Table 1. Hazard Definitions 
Manual Movement of Materials - Any movement of materials performed by 
the operator during the normal course of the job without mechanical 
aids will be considered as manual movement of materials. The movement 
shall be performed by the operator without the use of any mechanically 
operated handling equipment. The hazard must be presented directly by 
the material being moved and the consequences of making the move with 
the material. This excludes any hazard that might be present had the 
same action been performed without any material movement. 
Mechanical Movement of Materials - Any movement of materials performed 
by the operator during the normal course of the job using mechanical 
aids will be considered as mechanical movement of materials. The move­
ment shall be performed by the operator using mechanically operated 
handling equipment. The hazard must be presented directly by the 
material being moved and the consequences of making the move with the 
material. This excludes any hazard that might be present had the same 
action been performed without any material movement. 
Falls on Same Level - Any fall generated by gravity following the loss 
of equilibrium and ability to maintain an upright position that results 
in the point of contact of the person falling being at the same level 
or above the surface supporting the person at the inception of the fall 
will be considered a fall on the same level. The fall is the result of 
the operator moving from one place to another and excludes any hazards 
that might be present unless the operator is required to move in the 
area of the hazard that could cause a fall. 
Struck by Falling, Moving Object - Any object that receives its momentum 
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Table 1 continued 
from being dropped or from falling from a height will be considered as 
a falling, moving object. The hazard is presented by the falling object 
and is due to the force with which the operator would be struck by the 
falling object. This excludes objects that are thrown either by machin­
ery or by a person and is not concerned with the object once it has 
completed its fall. 
Danger From Moving Machinery - Any operation performed by the operator 
during the normal course of the job during which the operator is exposed 
to moving machine parts will be considered as danger from moving mach­
inery. The hazard is presented by moving teeth, splines, gears, projec­
tions, e t c , which would be capable of striking the operator or catching 
the operator or his clothing. Also included is the hazard presented at 
the point-of-operation when the machinery is in use. This excludes any 
parts of the machinery that are not moving. 
Bumping Into Objects - Any movement of the operator during the normal 
course of the job in which the operator supplies the impact when collid­
ing with non-moving projections or obstructions will be considered as 
bumping into objects. The hazard is presented by the impact with the 
object and is due to the movement of the operator and is not due to the 
movement of the projection or obstruction. This excludes any projections 
or obstructions that could cause a fall. 
Use of Hand Tools - Any use of mechanically or manually operated portable 
hand tools will be considered as the use of hand tools. The hazard is 
presented by the operation of the hand tool and not with the operation 
performed with the hand tool. If any type of hand tool is used during 
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Table 1 continued 
any phase of the operation, the hazard presented must be considered in 
this category. 
Danger from Electricity, Heat or Explosive - Any exposure to electricity, 
heat, or explosive material during the normal course of the job will be 
considered as danger from electricity, heat, or explosive. The hazard 
is presented by the inherent properties of the electricity, heat, and 
explosive material and is due to exposure to them. 
Danger from Harmful Substances - Any exposure to radiation, caustics, 
toxic and noxious substances during the normal course of the job will 
be considered as danger from harmful substances. The hazard is presented 
by the inherent properties of these substances and is due to exposure to 
these substances. 
Danger from Elevators, Hoists, and Conveyors - Any use of elevators, 
hoists, and conveyors during the normal course of the job will be 
considered to be danger from elevators, hoists, and conveyors. The 
hazard is directly due to the elevator, hoist, or conveyor and excludes 
the hazards presented by the movement of materials on the elevator, 
hoist, or conveyor. 
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Table 2. Degree Definitions and Degree Points 
Max, Pts, 
I, Handling Objects 
1, Manual 
a. Minimum of manual handling required of operation, 0 
b. Infrequent handling outside line of normal duty, 5 
c. Intermittent handling operations necessary to 
work progress, 10 
d. Frequent manual movement of heavy or bulky loads, 15 
e. Continuous movement of heavy or bulky material, 20 
2, Mechanical 
a. Little contact with mechanical handling equipment, 0 
b. Infrequent need of mechanical handling equipment, 5 
c. Operates in area where mechanical equipment 
operates frequently, 10 
d. Uses mechanical equipment frequently in course 
of operation. 15 
e. Continuous use of mechanical equipment, 20 
II, Falls 
I, Same Level 
a, Operates in open area with few obstructions and 
non-slip flooring, 0 
b. Operates in well organized area with normal 
flooring material. 2 
(From "The Evaluation of Industrial Hazards Through Techniques of Job 
Evaluation," Unpublished M, S. Thesis by Edward F, M, Hodge, Georgia 
Institute of Technology, 1969,) 
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T a b l e 2 c o n t i n u e d Max. P t s . 
c . Works i n c l u t t e r e d a rea wi th c l e a r a i s l e s and 
normal f l o o r i n g m a t e r i a l . 4 
do C l u t t e r e d work ing area wi th f r equen t movements 
r e q u i r e d . 6 
e . C l u t t e r e d work ing area wi th f r equen t movements 
and s l i p p e r y f l o o r m a t e r i a l s . 8 
2. D i f f e r e n t L e v e l 
a . Opera tes a t ground l e v e l a t a l l t i m e s . 0 
b . I n f r e q u e n t need t o ascend t o e l e v a t e d p o s i t i o n . 3 
c . Opera tes a t e l e v a t e d l e v e l w i t h adequate s a f e ­
guards and i n f r e q u e n t m o v e s . 6 
d . Frequent movement a t e l e v a t e d l e v e l wi th 
adequate s a f e g u a r d s . 9 
e . Opera tes f r e q u e n t l y a t e l e v a t e d l e v e l s wi th 
few s a f e g u a r d s . 12 
I I I . S t ruck by F a l l i n g Moving O b j e c t 
a . Works i n a rea where t h e r e i s l i t t l e danger from 
a b o v e . 0 
b . Works i n a rea where s m a l l , l i g h t o b j e c t s migh t 
f a l l a t i n f r e q u e n t i n t e r v a l s . 4 
c . Small o r medium s i z e o b j e c t s tend t o f a l l a t 
i n f r e q u e n t i n t e r v a l s . 8 
d . Small o r medium o b j e c t s f a l l a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s . 12 
e . Large o r heavy o b j e c t s have p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
f a l l i n g a t f r e q u e n t i n t e r v a l s . 16 
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Table 2 continued Max, Pts. 
IV. Danger from Moving Machinery 
a. Operates in area containing no moving machine 
parts. 0 
b. Infrequent visits necessary to an area containing 
moving machine parts. 3 
c. Continuous indirect contact with moving machine 
parts. 6 
d. Direct contact incurred with moving machine parts. 9 
e. Operates machinery with exposed moving parts. 12 
V. Bumping into Objects 
a. Works in open area with no obstructions. 0 
b 0 Works in well organized area. 2 
c. Cluttered area with clear operating area. 4 
d. Cluttered operating area with few movements 
required. 6 
e. Cluttered working area with frequent movement 
required. 8 
VI. Use of Hand Tools 
a. Operation requires minimum contact with any 
hand tool. 0 
b. Operation requires use of simple hand tools at 
infrequent intervals. 1 
c. Operates simple hand tool as normal function 
of work. 2 
d. Operates complex hand tools at infrequent intervals. 3 
19 
Table 2 continued Max. Pts. 
e. Operates complex hand tool(s) as normal part 
of job. 
VII. Danger from Electricity, Heat, or Explosive 
a. Operates in clear area with minimum of exposure. 0 
b. Operates in area where small amount of exposure 
is present. 3 
c. Operation requires frequent visits to high 
danger areas. 6 
d. Operates continuously in area where danger is 
present. 9 
e. Works in area where electrical wire is exposed 
or dangerous materials are being moved about. 12 
VIII. Danger from Harmful Substances 
a. Operates in open area with little chance of 
exposure. 0 
b. Operates where small amount of exposure is 
possible. 2 
c. Operation requires visits to high danger areas. 4 
d. Operates in area where there is a high 
possibility of exposure. 6 
e. Operates in high danger area with inadequate 
safeguards. 8 
IX. Danger from Elevators, Hoists, or Conveyors 
a. Minimal contact with each. 0 
b. Contact at infrequent intervals with guarded 
20 
Table 2 continued Max. Pts, 
machinery. 1 
c. Frequent contact with adequately guarded 
machinery. 2 
d. Infrequent contact with unguarded moving parts. 3 
e. Frequent contact with moving parts of unguarded 
machinery. 4 
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F a l l s 
Same Leve l 
D i f f . Level 
F a l l . , Mov. Obj. 
Machinery 
Bumping into Objs. 
Hand Tools 
E l e c , Heat, E x p l . 
Harmful Substances 
E l e v . , H o i s t s , Com 
r 1 • 1 ! i 
0 5 10 15 20 
0 5 10 15 20 
0 2 4 6 8 
0 3 6 9 12 
0 4 
oo 12 16 
0 3 6 9 12 
0 2 4 6 8 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 3 6 9 12 
o ! 2 4 6 8 
0 i 1 2 3 4 1 








(From "The Evaluation of Industrial Hazards Through Techniques of Job 
Evaluation," Unpublished M. S. Thesis by Edward F. M. Hodge, Georgia 
Institute of Technology, 1969.) 
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CHAPTER III 
APPLICATION OF THE HAZARD POTENTIAL RATING FORM 
The Hazard Potential Rating Form is used in the same manner as 
is the job evaluation point rating sheet. The jobs being rated are 
examined, hazard by hazard, and the appropriate number of points are 
assigned to each hazard according to its degree of accident potential. 
The points assigned to the individual hazard elements are then totaled 
to arrive at the total hazard rating for the operation. The rater 
should spend sufficient time studying each operation being rated so 
that no hazard present in the operation is overlooked. If necessary, 
the rater should consult with the worker performing the operation or 
with the supervisor of the operation in order that an accurate and 
complete evaluation of the hazard potential of the operation is obtained. 
Once the operation has been rated, a safety supervisor familiar with 
the operation should review and approve the completed rating form. 
Following the initial rating of an operation, the operation should 
be reviewed periodically to determine if any new hazards have been 
introduced that would require the operation to be re-evaluated. The 
operation should also be re-evaluated following any corrective action 
taken to reduce the degree of hazard in the operation. 
The use of this procedure provides a means for obtaining a quan­
titative, objective rating of the degree of hazard present in an indus­
trial operation. Although a certain degree of subjectiveness is inher­
ent in any evaluation procedure, the use of the Hazard Potential Rating 
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Form will reduce the degree of subjectiveness through the use of precise, 
objective definitions of the hazard elements and the degree of hazard. 
These precise definitions require little interpretation by the rater and 
this serves to control the degree of subjectiveness of the procedure. 
The use of the procedure also insures that the operations will be com­
pared on an equal basis. The Hazard Potential Rating Form contains 
the hazards to be considered and it is on this basis that job-to-job 
comparisons are made. 
The Hazard Potential Rating Form was used to rate the operations 
in the Recapping Department at Gordy Tire Company in Atlanta, Georgia, 
and receiving dock operations at Smith Transfer Corporation in Atlanta, 
Georgia. The Recapping Department is responsible for reconditioning 
passenger and truck tires that have tire tread worn to a point where 
the tire is no longer safe to use but still has a useable tire carcass 
on which a new tread can be placed. This is done by cementing a piece 
of prepared rubber on the tire carcass and then vulcanizing the tire 
by subjecting it to heat and pressure in a mold. The receiving dock 
operations consist of loading and unloading trucks and repairing and 
maintaining the trucks. The operations conducted by the Recapping 
Department and the receiving dock operations present a variety of 
hazards that would usually be present in a typical industrial plant. 
The investigation of these operations through the use of the Hazard 
Potential Rating Form should provide a suitable test for determining 
the reliability and predictive ability of the form. 
The historical accident data necessary for computing the reliabil­
ity and predictive ability of the form were supplied in the form of 
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Workmen's Compensation Cases, These "medical cases" are accidents that 
resulted in injuries that made it necessary for the injured person to 
receive treatment by some outside medical source. This accident data 
includes the number of days of lost time in the cases of lost time 
accidents and also the actual cost of the medical treatment and disabil­
ity payments under Workmen's Compensation Acts, The severity of each 
accident will be based on days of lost time and the cost of each acci­
dent will be based on only direct medical costs. The data supplied 
were analyzed to determine the number of accidents per operation, the 
average cost of an accident for each operation, and the severity (man-
days lost) of the accidents that had occurred for each operation. 
The testing of the Hazard Potential Rating Form will be discussed 
in the following chapter. The Hazard Potential Rating Form was applied 
to specific operations to determine an objective, quantitative rating 
for the degree of hazard within these operations. These ratings should 
indicate the most hazardous operations or the operations with the greatest 
potential for causing an accident. Using the historical data that was 
supplied, correlation coefficients will be developed for this data and 
the ratings that were computed in order to determine the degree of 
predictive ability of the form. The reliability of the procedure will 
also be investigated. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TESTING OF THE HAZARD POTENTIAL RATING FORM 
The Hazard Potential Rating Form was tested in the Recapping 
Department of the Gordy Tire Company in Atlanta, Georgia, and on receiv­
ing dock operations at Smith Transfer Corporation in Atlanta, Georgia,, 
The following operations were rated at Gordy Tire Company using the 
Hazard Potential Rating Form: 
Receiving and Inspection - This operation consists of first un­
loading tires that are delivered to be recapped. After the tires are 
unloaded they are placed on a machine that spreads the tire and rotates 
it to allow the tire to be easily and thoroughly inspected. Occasion­
ally it is also necessary to unload three hundred pound boxes of prepared 
rubbero 
Buffing - This operation consists of buffing off the tread on the 
tires that are to be recapped. The tires are placed in a machine with 
a rotating buffing wheel and are subjected to the buffing wheel until 
the desired amount of rubber has been removed. Occasionally this oper­
ation is done with a portable hand buffer. 
Cementing - In this operation cement is applied to the tire to 
cover any worn places left in the tire after the tread has been buffed 
off. The cement is highly flammable and there is also a danger of an 
explosion occurring. 
Build-Up - This operation consists of winding strips of prepared 
rubber around the tire carcass to form a basis for applying the new 
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tread. The tire carcasses are inserted in machines that rotate the tire 
carcasses while applying the strips of prepared rubber. 
Bagging and Rimming - In this operation the curing bag and rim 
are inserted in the tire. The tire is placed on a machine that spreads 
the tire and allows the bag and rim to be easily inserted. 
Molding - In this operation the tread is forced on the tires and 
the tires are vulcanized. The tires are placed in molds and the molds 
are heated to 300°F. The molds are then inserted in a machine and are 
subjected to pressure. Following this, the tires are removed from 
the machine and the mold. 
Trimming and Clean-Up - This operation consists of removing any 
excess rubber from the tire and then removing any blemishes that are 
on the tire. 
The management of the Gordy Tire Company cooperated fully in the 
investigation of these operations. The author was allowed unrestricted 
freedom in observing the operations and consultation with all supervisors 
and workers was permitted. 
The following operations were rated at Smith Transfer Corporation 
using the Hazard Potential Rating Form: 
Receiving and Shipping - This operation consists of loading out­
going trucks and unloading incoming trucks. The loads consist of a 
variety of commodities and both manual and mechanical methods are used 
in handling the loads. 
Driver - In this operation only the loading and unloading per­
formed by the drivers of trucks making deliveries within the city will 
be considered. 
27 
Maintenance - This operation consists primarily of fueling trucks, 
cleaning trailers, and checking tires, lights, etc. to insure that the 
truck is roadworthy. Occasionally it is necessary to assist the mechanic 
with his duties. 
Mechanic - This operation consists of the maintenance and repair 
of the mechanical parts of the trucks. 
In determining ratings for these operations the author was greatly 
aided by the dispatcher at Smith Transfer Company, who was thoroughly 
familiar with the operations rated. 
The operations described above were observed and were rated using 
the Hazard Potential Rating Form, The ratings determined for each oper­
ation represent an objective evaluation of the degree of hazard within 
the industrial operation. The operations receiving the highest ratings 
are the operations with the greatest degree of inherent hazard and are 
those operations that, discounting human behavior, should cause the 
greatest number of accidents and the most severe accidents. The ability 
of the rating form to predict the operations that cause the most acci­
dents and the most severe accidents will be tested through correlation 
of the ratings determined and past accident data of the operations 
rated. The past accident data supplied included accident records for 
1967 and 1968 for Gordy Tire Company and records for the last quarter 
of 1967, entire year of 1968, and the first quarter of 1969 for Smith 
Transfer Corporation, This was the only accident data that was avail­
able. The rating for each operation and the historical accident data 
pertaining to each operation are listed in Table 4 (Gordy Tire Company) 
and Table 5 (Smith Transfer Corporation), 
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In developing correlation coefficients for the ratings and the 
historical accident data, a linear correlation was assumed due to the 
small sample size. The following formula from E. S. Buffa (15) was 
used in computing the correlation coefficients: 
N N N 
N Z X T Y . - (Zx ) ( Z Y.) 
i=l i=l i=l 
\M xi 2 - <f y2] • i4,\2 - < . v i > 2 ] 
^ 1=1 1=1 1=1 1=1 
Where: X^ = Hazard Potential Rating of the operation for i = 1 to 
N. 
Y^ = (1) accidents per operation, (2) accidents per employee 
performing operation, (3) severity (mandays lost) per 
operation, (4) average cost per accident, for the opera­
tion for i = 1 to N. 
N = number of operations rated. 
Following the determination of the correlation coefficients, the 
coefficients were tested using a one-tailed test of Student's "t distribu­
tion to determine at what level of significance the corresponding popula­
tion correlation coefficient differs from zero. 
Following are the correlation coefficients and the levels of 
significance computed for the operations at Gordy Tire Company. The 
coefficient of correlation between the ratings determined and the number 
of accidents per operation was computed and found to be 0.93. This 
would indicate that the number of accidents per operation was positively 
correlated with the hazard ratings. The coefficient was tested for 
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significance and it was determined that the coefficient of correlation 
was significantly different from zero at a 0 . 5 per cent level of signi­
ficance. However, the number of accidents per operation is dependent 
on the amount of exposure of the employees performing the operation. 
Thus, a correlation coefficient was computed for the hazard ratings 
and the accidents per employee performing the operation. This corre­
lation coefficient was found to be equal to 0 .81 and it was determined 
that the coefficient of correlation was significantly different from 
zero at a 2 . 5 per cent level of significance. This is an indication 
that the number of accidents per employee performing the operation is 
directly correlated with the hazard ratings. A coefficient of correla­
tion was computed to determine the degree of correlation between the 
hazard ratings and the severity (mandays lost) of the accidents resulting 
from each operation. The correlation coefficient was computed to be 
0 .96 and it was found that this figure was significantly different from 
zero at a 0 .05 per cent level of significance. This also indicates 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f a positive correlation between the hazard ratings 
and the severity of the accidents due to each operation. A correlation 
coefficient was also computed to determine the degree of correlation 
between the hazard ratings and the average cost per accident for an 
operation. This correlation coefficient was found to be 0 . 5 0 which 
indicates only a slight degree of correlation. However, it is felt 
that not enough accidents had occurred to present an accurate value for 
the average cost per accident for several of the operations. 
Following are the correlation coefficients and the levels of 
significance computed for the operations at Smith Transfer Corporation. 
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The coefficient of correlation between the ratings determined and the 
number of accidents per operation was computed and found to be 0.98, 
This figure was tested for significance and found to be significantly 
different from zero at a 2.5 per cent level of significance. This would 
indicate a positive correlation between the hazard ratings and the number 
of accidents per operation. However, in order to compensate for the 
amount of exposure for becoming involved in an accident, a correlation 
coefficient was computed between the hazard ratings for the operations 
and the number of accidents per employee performing the operation. This 
correlation coefficient was found to be 0.61, which indicates a slight 
degree of correlation. However, in computing the number of accidents 
per driver performing the driving operation, the total number of drivers 
making city deliveries was used. Some of the drivers spend more time 
unloading and loading trucks than do other drivers. There was no way 
to compensate for this unequal exposure to hazards and it is reflected 
in the computed correlation coefficient. A direct correlation was shown 
between the hazard ratings and the average cost per accident for an 
operation. This correlation coefficient was computed and was found to 
be 0.84 and it was determined that the coefficient was significantly 
different from zero at a 10.0 per cent level of significance. A posi­
tive correlation was also indicated between the ratings for the opera­
tions and the severity (mandays lost) of the accidents for an operation. 
The correlation coefficient was computed to be 0.98 and it was found 
that the coefficient was significantly different from zero at a 2.5 per 
cent level of significance. 
For one plant the analysis of the predictive ability of the 
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Hazard Potential Rating Form indicated that the hazard ratings determined 
were positively correlated with (1) the number of accidents per opera­
tion, (2) the number of accidents per employee performing the operation, 
and (3) the severity (mandays lost) of the accidents per operation. A 
slight correlation was indicated between the hazard ratings and the 
average cost per accident for an operation. For the other plant, the 
analysis indicated that the hazard ratings determined were positively 
correlated with (1) the number of accidents per operation, (2) the aver­
age cost per accident for an operation, and (3) the severity (mandays 
lost) of the accidents per operation. A slight correlation was indicated 
between the hazard ratings and the number of accidents per employee 
performing the operation. The correlation coefficients and the levels 
of significance computed are summarized in Table 6. 
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Table 4. Comparison of Hazard Ratings and Historical 











Molding 28 7 $43.00 14 
Receiving and Inspection 20 3 32.00 10 
Bagging and Rimming 19 5 28.00 7 
Cementing 15 3 50.00 0 
Trimming and Clean-Up 12 1 44.00 0 
Buffing 12 0 - -
Build-Up 10 0 - -
Accident data based on medical cases from 1967 and 1968. 
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Table 5. Comparison of Hazard Ratings and Historical 
Accident Data (Smith Transfer Corporation) 
Number Avg Cost Severity 
of per (Mandays 
Operation Rating Accidents Accident Lost) 




7 $94.60 32 
7 22.10 18 
1 15.00 3 
0 
Accident data based on medical cases from the last quarter of 1967, 
entire year of 1968, and first quarter of 1969. 
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Table 6. Computed Correlation Coefficients and Levels 
of Significance 





Number of Accidents 
per Operation .93 0.5% 
Number of Accidents per 
Employee Performing Operation .81 2.5% 
Severity (Mandays Lost) of 
Accidents per Operation .96 0.05% 
Average Cost per Accident 
per Operation .50 15.0% 





Number of Accidents 
per Operation .98 2.5% 
Number of Accidents per 
Employee Performing Operation .61 20.0% 
Severity (Mandays Lost) of 
Accidents per Operation .98 2.5% 
Average Cost per Accident 
per Operation .84 10.0% 
35 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this thesis was to test the predictive ability 
of a previously developed form, similar to a job evaluation point rating 
form, that had been designed to evaluate the degree of hazard in indus­
trial operations. It was thought that the use of this form would permit 
the operations causing the most accidents and the most severe accidents 
to be determined in advance so that preventive measures could be selec­
tively applied. These operations should correspond to the operations 
receiving the highest ratings. 
Seven operations in the Recapping Department at Gordy Tire Company 
and four receiving dock operations at Smith Transfer Corporation were 
observed and rated. The hazard ratings determined were then tested by 
linear correlation with historical accident data for the operations 
rated. For the operations observed at Gordy Tire Company, this analysis 
indicated a positive correlation existed between the hazard ratings and 
(1) the number of accidents per operation at a 0.5 per cent level of 
significance, (2) the number of accidents per employee performing the 
operation at a 2.5 per cent level of significance, and (3) the severity 
(mandays lost) of the accidents per operation at a 0.05 per cent level 
of significance. A very slight correlation was indicated between the 
hazard ratings and the average cost per accident for an operation. For 
the operations observed at Smith Transfer Corporation, this analysis 
indicated a positive correlation existed between the hazard ratings and 
36 
(1) the number of accidents per operation at a 2.5 per cent level of 
significance, (2) the average cost per accident for an operation at a 
10,0 per cent level of significance, and (3) the severity (mandays lost) 
of the accidents per operation at a 2,5 per cent level of significance, 
A slight correlation was indicated between the hazards ratings and the 
number of accidents per employee performing the operation. 
These results indicate that the use of the Hazard Potential 
Rating Form should provide an effective procedure to evaluate the degree 
of hazard in an industrial operation. However, it is recommended that 
the form be subjected to further testing in order to verify the results 
obtained in this thesis. Further investigation should also be done to 
determine if the assumption of a linear correlation was valid. It is 
also recommended that the use of the form be implemented into an actual 
operating safety program. The safety performance should then be observed 
to determine if there is any significant reduction of accidents. 
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APPENDIX 
HAZARD POTENTIAL RATING FORMS FOR RATED OPERATIONS 
The following pages contain completed Hazard Potential Rating 




Hazard Potential Rating Form 
Hazard 
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CD 0) 0) 
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 ft re 
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CO P H 
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F a l l s 
Same Level 
Dif f . Level 
F a l l . , Mov. Obj. 
Machinery 
Bumping into Objs, 
Hand Tools 
E l e c , Heat, Expl , 
Harmful Substances 
E l e v . , Hoists, Con* 
! 
0 5 5 10 15 20 5 
0 0 5 10 15 20 0 
0 0 2 4 6 8 0 
0 0 3 6 9 12 0 
0 4 4 8 12 16 4 
0 3 6 9 9 12 9 
0 0 2 4 6 8 0 
0 0 1 2 3 4 0 
0 3 6 9 9 12 9 
0 o ' 2 4 6 8 0 















Hazard Potent ia l Rating Form 
Hazard 
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F a l l s 
Same Leve l 
D i f f . Leve l 
F a l l . , Mov. Obj. 
Machinery-
Bumping into Objs . 
Hand Tools 
E l e c , Heat, E x p l . 
Harmful Substances 
E l e v . , Ho is ts , Con. 
i 
0 5 10 10 15 20 10 
0 0 5 10 15 20 0 
0 2 4 4 6 8 4 
0 3 3 6 9 12 3 
0 0 4 8 12 16 0 
0 3 3 6 9 12 3 
0 0 2 4 6 8 0 
0 0 1 2 3 4 0 
0 0 3 6 9 12 0 
0 0 2 4 6 8 0 
0 0 1 2 3 4 0 
Tota l Hazard Rating £Q 








Hazard Potential Rating Form 
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Handling Objects 
T 
Manual 0 5 5 10 15 20 5 
Mechanical 0 0 5 10 15 20 0 
Falls 
Same Level 0 0 2 4 6 8 0 
Diff. Level 0 0 3 6 9 12 0 
Fall., Mov. Obj. 0 4 4 8 12 16 4 
Machinery 0 3 6 9 9 12 9 
Bumping into Objs. 0 0 2 4 6 8 0 
Hand Tools 0 i—
1 
1 2 3 4 
E l e c , Heat, Expl. 0 0 3 6 9 12 0 
Harmful Substances 0 o ' 2 4 6 8 0 
Elev., Hoists, Con. 0 0 i 1 2 3 4 0 
Total Hazard Rating 
Operation Bagging and Rimming R a t e r Harris 






Hazard Potent ia l Rating Form 
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Manual 0 5 5 10 15 20 5 
Mechanical 0 0 5 10 15 20 0 
F a l l s 
Same Leve l 0 0 2 4 6 8 0 
D i f f . Level 0 0 3 6 9 12 0 
F a l l . , Mov. Obj. 0 0 4 8 12 16 0 
Machinery 0 0 3 6 9 12 o 
Bumping into Objs , 0 0 2 4 6 8 0 
Hand Tools 0 0 1 2 3 4 0 
E l e c , Heat, E x p l . 0 3 6 6 9 12 6 
Harmful Substances o ; 2 4 4 6 8 4 
E l e v . , H o i s t s , Conk 0 0 1 1 2 3 4 0 
Total Hazard Rating 
Operation Cementing Rater Harris 
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0 0 2 4 6 8 0 
0 1 2 3 3 4 3 
0 0 3 6 9 12 0 
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Hazard Potential Rating Form 
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Machinery 0 3 6 6 9 12 6 
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Hand Tools 0 0 1 2 3 4 0 
Elec, Heat, Expl. 0 0 3 6 9 12 0 
Harmful Substances 0 o ' 2 4 6 8 0 
Elev., Hoists, Con. 0 0 i 1 2 3 4 0 
Total Hazard Rating 
Operation Build-Up Rater Harris 




Hazard Potential Rating Form 
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Bumping into Objs. 0 CM J 2 4 6 8 CM 
Hand Tools 0 1 2 2 3 4 
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Handling Objects 1 
Manual 0 5 10 10 15 20 10 
Mechanical 0 0 5 10 15 20 o 
F a l l s 
Same Level 0 2 4 4 6 8 4 
Diff . Level 0 3 6 6 9 1 2 6 
F a l l . , Mov. Obj. 0 0 4 8 1 2 16 0 
Machinery 0 0 3 6 9 1 2 0 
Bumping into Objs. 0 2 4 4 6 8 4 
Hand Tools 0 1 2 2 3 4 2 
E l e c , Heat, Expl. 0 
3 
3 6 9 1 2 3 
Harmful Substances 
0 o r 2 4 6 8 0 E l e v . , Hoists, Con. 0 ° i 1 2 3 4 0 
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Hazard Potential Rating Form 
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Diff . Level 0 3 3 6 9 1 2 3 
F a l l . , Mov. Obj. 0 0 4 8 1 2 16 0 
Machinery 0 3 3 6 9 1 2 3 
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Hand Tools 0 0 1 2 3 4 0 
E l e c , Heat, Expl . 0 3 6 6 9 12 6 
Harmful Substances 0 o ! 2 4 6 8 0 
E l e v . , Hoists, Conk 0 
0 i 1 2 3 4 0 
Total Hazard Rating 
Operation Maintenance Rater Harris 
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